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The Place of Religion in the 
Iconography of Democracy and the 
Politics/Aesthetics of ‘Representation’ 
(Race/Religion/Sex) 
Yvonne Sherwood, University of Glasgow 
Looking (briefly) at a few test cases, this article raises some preliminary questions about crude and 
aporetical uses of the category ‘religion’ in European law, public policy, and what might be called the 
cultural aesthetics of the democratic. In particular I explore awkward updates of blasphemy 
legislation. Symptomatically, these a) pluralise religion to the point where lack of religion, or as the 
revised German criminal code of 1969 puts it Weltanschauungsvereinigungen (‘World-View 
Organisations’?) are welcomed under the canopy of protection, provided that they can prove quasi-
religious status; and b) rework religion as a category akin to race in legislation against racial and 
religious ‘hate’. I also briefly probe anti-discrimination legislation in England and Wales, where a so-
called ‘philosophical’ belief can qualify as religious belief, worthy of the same protection, if it can be 
proved that ‘it is a belief and not an opinion or view based on the present state of information 
available’; it is ‘genuinely held’; it is ‘compatible’ with ‘human dignity’ and ‘human rights’; it is 
‘weighty and substantial’ and attains a ‘certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance’. 
The crude pairings of ‘religion and philosophy’ appear as rudimentary and clumsy counterpoints to 
subtle theoretical formulations of the theologico-political. But they cry out for exposure and 
theoretical analysis: the kind of analysis that breaks through the usual division of labour where 
government-sponsored analysis of the function and force of religion in the public sphere is left to 
fact-finders who gather empirical data. Force is not an effect of numbers, or intentions, but also of 
formulations, conceptualisations, deliberate and accidental. It therefore seems important to point 
out that one strong, basic understanding of religion still operating in the public sphere doggedly 
follows the centuries-old Kantian subdivisions between believing, opining and knowing. Beyond 
accusations that modern democratic states are too secular, or too persistently Christian, we need to 
work open the aporia of democracies seeking to pluralise religion beyond religion, even to the point 
of non-religion, but at the same time persistently reifying religion as the public gatekeeper for 
sincerity, rights, weight, height and depth. With inevitably problematic implications, religion seems 
to function as a tolerated and respected heteronomy, insofar as religion is reformulated, in a late 
modern ethic of tolerance, as one of those inviolable markers of identity that demand reverence-
respect. Religion is being understood as that which defines and exceeds the individual, operating on 
him/her as an incontestable given such as sexuality or the colour of his/her skin when, in an 
aesthetics of democracy based on selective ‘representation’ and reification of particular differences, 
religion is placed alongside sex and ethnicity/race.  
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1. CURIOUS IMAGES OF THE BIBLE AS A PUBLIC STRUCTURE 
AND THE BIBLE WITH A FACE 
The ideas that I am presenting here in quite a condensed form began as reflections on a spectacular 
public furore that irrupted over a graffited Bible exhibited at the Glasgow Museum of Modern Art in 
2009.1 Briefly, a gay Christian artist laid out Family Faith and Values edition of the King James 
Version, with pens and an open invitation ‘If you feel you have been excluded from the Bible, please 
write your way back into it’. The graffiti and marginalia that followed were for the large part entirely 
predictable; not so the response. Outrage was voiced not just by representatives of religion – no less 
a figure than the Pope got involved – but far more interestingly and symptomatically by 
representatives of the civic and public, who joined in the unanimous outrage and, where necessary, 
acts of repentance and contrition. The wounded Bible was closed off in a glass case for its own 
protection – then removed altogether and replaced with three pages of justificatory text about 
intended ‘aims’ and ‘outcomes’ and the public goods and ‘deliverables’ that had been achieved. The 
artist publicly recanted/repented, as did the museum. Obscenity and blasphemy laws were invoked, 
explicitly and implicitly. Respondents variously suggested (in an interesting assumption about who 
owns the Bible) that the Anglican church should ‘sue’.2 Alternatively, they recommended that a 
security camera be mounted above the exhibit, together with a clear warning that any improper 
response could result in ‘legal prosecution’.3 The Bible was presented as an assaulted subject, 
which/who had been ‘defaced’. Accusations of metaphorical GBH (‘grievous bodily harm’) were 
accompanied by victim shots of the Bible with its biro scars and sutures. ‘The copy of the Bible at 
Glasgow’s Gallery of Modern Art has been defaced with abuse and obscenities’ lamented the 
caption in the Daily Mail. MP’s denounced the act as a clear violation of principles, if not tacit laws 
or tolerance and anti-discrimination. They regularly described the biro marks as acts of ‘vandalism’ –
hence by implication turning the Bible into public structure like a bus shelter or an art gallery.  
These two images intrigued me, and set me thinking: the notion of the Bible as a vandalised 
public edifice; and the image of the Bible as a wounded subject, a damaged face. Both beg for further 
analysis and reflection. Both suggest that the relationship between religion and politics is far more 
complex, aporetic, and tangled than the notion of a public-private dichotomy, with a firewall firmly 
separating ‘church’ from ‘state’.  
2. THE CHANGING SHAPE OF ‘RELIGION’ IN LEGISLATION ON 
BLASPHEMY, DISCRIMINATION AND ‘RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS 
HATE’ 
This case prompted me to carry out some research on mutations of the category of blasphemy – 
which was only tacitly invoked (unlike obscenity) in this context, and for good reason. In the early 
years of the twenty-first century, a concerted and strategic invocation of the Islamic other – 
emblematised in the infamous Mohammad cartoons, or the case of the Sudanese authorities 
prosecuting the unfortunate British schoolteacher Gillian Gibbons for naming a classroom teddy 
bear Mohammad4 – led to a shaming of the category of blasphemy or, as in England and Wales, the 
repeal of old antiquated blasphemy laws and their replacement with new legislation against ‘racial 
and religious hate’. Even prior to these major late modern revisions, blasphemy had undergone 
some major internal shifts. Up until the nineteenth or in some cases the twentieth century, 
blasphemy was understood as a parallel category to libel. The offended party was God or the public 
institutions that represented him: Church, Law and State. So for example in the Prussian Criminal 
Code of 1851, the culpable blasphemer is one who ‘blasphemes God or mocks one of the Christian 
churches … or the objects of its reverence, its teachings, institutions or customs, or presents them in 
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a way that exposes them to hatred or contempt’. By the time of the updated statute of 1969, the 
site of offence has shifted from God, Church and ‘objects of reverence’ to society and the subject. 
The focus is now on ‘insult*ing+ the content of others’ religious faith’.5 In a similar vein, the English 
Draft Code of 1879 sees the ‘essence of the offence’ as lying in ‘the outrage which it inflicts upon the 
religious feelings of the community’.6 A major shift is taking place here, from a crime against 
God/the state to a violation of society or the individual subject and his/her religious feelings. 
Blasphemy becomes a crime against the subject and her belief, sometimes conceived as if it were 
personal property. As F. LaGard Smith puts it in Blasphemy and the Battle for Faith, blasphemy is 
‘the feeling that one gets when his *sic.+ house is broken into or his car is stolen’; it is the ‘righteous 
indignation’ that wells up ‘when someone touches your most serious psychological nerves’.7 The 
metaphor is of a thief breaking into one’s house/person as a sacrosanct interior and damaging a 
precious vial of belief.  
Long prior to the repeal or obsolescence of European blasphemy laws, God was disappearing as 
the ostensible target and was being replaced by the believing subject. The problems of who counts 
as an aggrieved subject were then quite starkly performed in recent legislation on racial and 
religious hate. Two features of recent UK legislation are worthy of comment: the pluralisation of 
religion to the point where it includes the lack of religion; and the reworking of religion as a category 
akin to race. Like many Western democracies, England and Wales replaced their fusty old blasphemy 
law with the new category of ‘Incitement to … Religious Hatred’ implemented as part of the anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill and designed to supplement the already existing category of 
‘incitement to racial hatred’.8 In legal terms Jews and Sikhs already qualified as racial groups, 
covered by legislation about ‘racial hatred’.9 The supplementary category ‘religious hatred’ extended 
the same kind of protection accorded by virtue of racial identity to religious identities that were less 
clearly ‘racial’. But even for groups for whom the equation could be not be so clearly made – for 
example (and not merely one example among others), Muslims – the implication was that religion 
was an identity category equivalent to race. The new legislation expanded the category of religion to 
include all religions and also lack of religion. It defined ‘religious hatred’ in a deliberately broad and 
ambiguous fashion as ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or 
lack of religious belief.’10 The glorious paradoxes of our understandings of the secular become 
apparent in the very attempt to carry out the secular imperative to expand and pluralise the 
category of religion so that all religions, and everything like religion, including the lack thereof, is 
represented. A personal favourite is Section 166 of the German criminal code of 1969, struggling to 
update blasphemy laws in a statute prohibiting ‘Die Beschimpfung von Bekenntnissen, 
Religionsgesellschaften und Weltanschauungsvereinigungen’ – that is, the insulting of faiths, 
religious societies and literally ‘World-View Organisations’ or ‘Organisations dedicated to a 
philosophy of life.’11 The category Weltanschauungsvereinigungen begs the question of what could 
possibly qualify as a world view with a similar depth, privilege and power as religion. (the answer 
being, narrowly, those officially recognised institutions for atheism or free thought that have 
achieved public status as the official other of religion.12) Secularism insists on the pluralising and 
‘secularising’ of religion, but at the same time it requires that we stay close to the category of 
religion to define forms of personal investment that are similarly deep, inviolable, and worthy of 
respect.  
The curiosities of an ostensibly secular state and its legal system privileging the category of 
religion were nicely illustrated in a recent ruling in the UK.13 When Tim Nicholson, the Head of 
Sustainability for a leading property company was made redundant in July 2009, he argued before a 
judge that his redundancy was due to the contempt with which his boss treated his ‘philosophical’ 
beliefs about climate change. In this context the word ‘philosophy’ was being used in the technical 
legal sense of ‘religion or philosophy’ – philosophy being the ostensible secular, equal partner for 
religion. (Again, the act of pluralising religion out until it includes lack of religion is taken as a sign of 
the good faith of the secular state). But as with Weltanschauungsvereinigungen, an inherent 
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problem lies in the terms of proof of an equivalent status to religion. This leads us into the quite 
lovely terrain of secularised proofs of sacrality. While lawyers acting on behalf of the property 
company tried to prove that Nicholson’s environmental commitments were (merely?) political and a 
‘lifestyle choice’, Nicholson and his team attempted to prove that it qualified as the equivalent of 
religion – for very revealing reasons. In media interviews, Nicholson declared ‘It is the moral and 
ethical values that I hold that have motivated me to action on climate change and these moral and 
ethical values are similar to those promoted by the world’s major religions’. Helpfully pointing to 
those features understood to be defining criteria of the ‘religious’, culled from widely-recognised 
features of Christianity, he averred that his beliefs had an apocalyptic-catastrophic dimension and 
demanded radical self- and world-reorientation: ‘I encourage others to reduce their carbon 
emissions and I fear very much for the future of the human race, given the failure to reduce carbon 
emissions on a global scale’. Invoking another widely held perception, and one tenable in law –
namely that religious beliefs are particularly deeply held and life-changing – he explained to the 
media how his green beliefs affected every dimension of how he lived his life ‘including *his+ choice 
of home, how [he] travels, what [he] buys, what [he] eats and drinks, what [he] does with [his] waste 
and *his+ hopes and fears’. In his ruling, the judge invoked five tests of whether a philosophical belief 
could come under employment regulations on religious discrimination, namely: 
 The belief must be genuinely held. 
 It must be a belief and not an opinion or view based on the present state of 
information available. 
 It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life. 
 It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. 
 It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human 
dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others. 
In the ruling, depth and genuineness of commitment were taken as the key indicators of ‘religion’ 
and its secular cognates. ‘In my judgment, his belief goes beyond a mere opinion’, the judge said. In 
short, his philosophical beliefs qualified as a secular cognate of religion on the basis that they 
exceeded the realm of fact and knowledge, and yet were deeply held.  
This is a profoundly Kantian model of religion; and it seems that this three-hundred year old 
formulation of the place of religion seems to operate by default – by which I mean for lack of meta-
philosophical reflection – in the public and legal realm. We can clearly discern the Kantian 
distinctions between believing (glauben) opining (meinen) and knowing (wissen), and the notion of 
religious belief as a ‘holding something to be true’ or Fürwahrhalten that is not open to verification. 
We can also spot the old Kantian axiom that the true core of religion must be fully consonant with 
human dignity, Würde, and the moral foundations of the nascent modern state.  
3. REFLECTIONS ON THE PIETIES OF TOLERANCE, THE AES-
THETICS OF THE DEMOCRATIC, AND THE ‘SECULARISATION’ 
(?) OF REVERENCE AS RESPECT. 
In conclusion, I want to reflect a little on what I am calling the ‘Pieties of Tolerance’, the ‘Aesthetics 
of the Democratic’, and the ‘Secularisation’ (?) of Reverence as Respect’. In her book Regulating 
Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Wendy Brown helpfully documents the 
transition from the early modern, Lockean formulation of tolerance to its recent renaissance as the 
emblem of public good. For Locke and his contemporaries, tolerance was based on the premise that 
‘man’ as a universal creature, only contingently divided by language, culture nation or ethnicity, is 
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free to choose the form of his belief or unbelief.14 In contrast late modern tolerance takes as its 
object what sociologists call the ‘ascriptive identity’ of a person – that which is understood to be 
rooted in inner nature or manifested in external bodily attributes.15 Tolerance has to do with 
identitarian truth, and is tied to the idea of managing particular insurmountable differences. As 
Brown puts it, there is major shift ‘from a universal subject imagined to arrive at particular beliefs or 
values through revelation or deliberation to a particular subject (of sexuality, ethnicity, etc.) who is 
thought to have these beliefs or values by virtue of who he or she is’.16  
Tolerance, emblematised in the respect of certain iconic differences, is intrinsic to what I am 
thinking about as the aesthetics or iconography of democracy. Essential to the idea of democracy is 
equal representation: the substitutability of one individual for another; the notion that we are all the 
same. But potentially this makes for a bland, faceless idea, or one that seems dismissive or cavalier 
in respect of our particular personhoods, reducing us all to one person, one vote. So, to 
counterbalance this, democracies use particular sites of indentitarian difference, particular faces, 
groups, people, as signs of democracy’s concern or investment in care. In the mechanics of 
democracy, an elected MP represents his/her constituents. In the symbolism of democracy, an 
iconically protected person represents the desire to give all people protection and respect. The 
modern democratic state represents the dream of a perfect inclusivity/tolerance that will, one fine 
day, be fully realised. Since it can never be fully realised, the desire to protect every identity needs 
to be crudely and synecdochally represented in the interim. There is an aesthetics or symbolism of 
democracy, in which the good faith of a government turned towards the individual is shown through 
representative, selected, personhoods, or faces. Three particular modes of difference are prioritised: 
those of race, religion and sex. Religion is understood as a category akin to race and sex. 
Formulated thus, religion becomes a particular order of believing that is ontologised and 
essentialised. In modernity, we easily use the shorthand of being or not being religious in a way that 
we would not talk about being or not being feminist or Marxist. The verb ‘to be’ here seems to have 
a certain power, a certain relation to essence. One thinks of the habitually used phrase ‘deeply-held 
convictions’ to describe religious believing/affiliation, a phrase used as naturally by vociferous 
opponents of religion as it is by religion’s adherents. Richard Dawkins and his ilk habitually talk of 
‘deeply held convictions’. All curiously unite in the knowledge that religion is, above all things, the 
mark of permanence and depth. Unlike a lifestyle ‘choice’ or a political ‘opinion’ or ‘viewpoint’, 
religion is not seen as something ephemeral, susceptible to change. It is not capable of sliding off the 
surface of the individual, so to speak. Exceptionally and anomalously, religious belief is defined as a 
mode of commitment that is not, in a sense, chosen. It is understood as defining or exceeding the 
individual, operating on him/her as an incontestable given such as sexuality or the colour of his/her 
skin. ‘My God’ here functions as the equivalent of my sexual orientation or my race – that which 
exceeds and defines me, quite genuinely; as that which calls me, incontrovertibly, and so in turn calls 
for your protection and respect.  
Sacrality is thus redefined in a distinctly modern fashion as the protection of a marked site of 
‘respect’. But this distinctly modern version of making-sacred is vastly different to more traditional 
ways of marking the boundary line between the sacred and profane. The Holy of Holies, the inner 
sanctum, is no longer God or even the content or institutions of religion but the inviolable core of 
the religious subject, marked off as worthy of respect. Subjectivity is emblematised in the sacred 
text, imagined to be the focus of belief or the object of love/affection for the other. Scriptures in this 
way become a stand-in for the subject or a group of religious subjects. The fundamental quasi-
sacralising principle seems to be that ‘We must not be rude to anyone else’s scriptures’. The idea 
that anyone would want to be rude or aggressive to their own scriptures is never entertained. This 
explains deep background to the case of the defaced Bible, portrayed as an abused subject, and 
sealed off for its own protection in a glass case. The Bible was understood not as the Book of God 
but as the Book of the Christian Subject, and the surrogate sign of the Christian subject who must be 
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tolerated, protected. Defacing the Bible was interpreted as an offence against a subject or a 
particular group of subjects. In a distinctly and peculiarly modern fashion, the Word once again 
became flesh.  
We have come a very long way from Moses removing his sandals before the burning bush (Exod. 
3.5) or Rudolf Otto on the mysterium tremendum fascinans.17 The holy has been relocated in the 
belief of the other, indicated in the simple bland fact of ‘being Muslim’ or ‘being Christian’ and being 
recognised/respected as such in the public realm. The question of our own believing, involvement in 
or affection for the sacred text is irrelevant. Tolerance as the respect of difference is indifferent to 
the question of our belief/investment. Tolerance and tacit rules against blasphemy favour the beliefs 
of the other; they tend towards the protection of the beliefs of the other. God/the sacred becomes 
the belief of the other person, just as reverence becomes respect. In sharp contradistinction to pre-
modern boundaries between the profane and the sacred, here the call to respect the cordon sealing 
off the sacred object is entirely separable from the call to believe or to actively involve oneself in the 
religion or sacred text.  
Once the holy is relocated in the religious subject or the text that represents him/her, the zone of 
reverence or respect can be universally acknowledged and respected. This is why the whole energy 
of the civic and the public could be energised in defending not the bruised corpus that related 
specifically to the wounded body of Christ, but rather an offence against a particular subject or a 
particular group of subjects. The scene is no longer one of the particular individual or community 
encountering the holy in the fire at the top of the mountain or the scroll revealed from the heavens, 
but rather a whole society acknowledging the relocated sacred in a functionally bland and easily 
‘respect-able’ way. The distinction is asserted in a gentle way so that all can theoretically participate 
in a new all-inclusive distinction between the sacred and profane. The sacred is defined as the zone 
that will permit only appropriately respectful and strictly delimited forms of speech; constructive 
dialogue as a softer, banalised form of worship. Worshipping turns into respecting. There is a 
considerable difference – but not absolute antinomy – between being worthy of worship and being 
worthy of respect. 
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